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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This matter comes before us on cross-appeals from the 
District Court’s ruling on a petition for interim injunctive 
relief sought by the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) pursuant to § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations 
Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).  For nearly forty years, 
since Eisenberg ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 
519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1975), we have held that to award 
interim injunctive relief under § 10(j) “a federal district court 
must merely find ‘reasonable cause’ to believe an unfair labor 
practice has occurred and must determine that the relief 
sought is ‘just and proper.’”  Kobell v. Suburban Lines, Inc., 
731 F.2d 1076, 1078 (3d Cir. 1984).  The District Court in 
this case, following a thoughtful discussion of pertinent 
precedents, determined that our two-prong approach was 
inconsistent with pronouncements of the Supreme Court 
dating back nearly thirty years, to Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).  See Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. 
Grane Health Care Co., ___ F. Supp. 2d ____, 2011 WL 
2517037, at *5-14 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2011).  Applying the 
familiar four-factor test applicable to generic preliminary 
injunction motions—likelihood of success on the merits; 
imminent threat of irreparable harm; balance of equities 
favoring interim injunctive relief; and the public interest 
being served by the interim relief—the District Court granted 
the requested interim bargaining order but denied the 
requested interim hiring of several aggrieved individuals.  
Having carefully considered the matter, we conclude that the 
Supreme Court decisions upon which the District Court 
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relied, having arisen in completely different contexts and 
involving statutory schemes unrelated to the NLRA, do not 
warrant abrogation of our two-prong approach to § 10(j) 
petitions.  Furthermore, we will affirm the interim bargaining 
order issued by the District Court, as plainly compelled under 
the two-prong approach.  As to the requested interim hiring 
orders, however, we believe that the District Court should, in 
the first instance, determine whether such relief is appropriate 
under our two-prong approach. 
I. Facts and Proceedings 
 
 Prior to January 1, 2010, Cambria County, 
Pennsylvania owned and operated Laurel Crest Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center (“Laurel Crest”), a facility located in 
Ebensburg, Pennsylvania.  All of the employees of Laurel 
Crest were employed by Cambria County, who as a public 
employer was subject to the Pennsylvania State Public 
Employee Relations Act (“PERA”), 43 P.S. § 1101.301(1).  
Since its certification in 1971 by the Pennsylvania Labor 
Relations Board, the Professional and Public Service 
Employees of Cambria County a/w Laborers’ District Council 
of Western Pennsylvania, Local 1305 (“Local 1305”) was the 
collective-bargaining representative of a unit of non-
professional employees employed by Cambria County at 
Laurel Crest.  Cambria County recognized Local 1305 as the 
exclusive bargaining representative of the unit, and entered 
into a series of collective-bargaining agreements with Local 
1305, the most recent of which ended in December, 2008. 
 In September, 2009, Appellant Grane Healthcare Co. 
(“Grane”), a private entity that owns and manages several 
Pennsylvania nursing facilities, entered into an asset purchase 
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agreement with Cambria County to purchase Laurel Crest.  
On January 1, 2010, the purchase became final, and Grane 
assumed operations of Laurel Crest.1
 In May, 2010, following an investigation of the charge, 
the Board’s General Counsel, through Robert W. Chester, the 
Acting Regional Director of Region 6 (“Director”), issued a 
complaint and notice of hearing against Grane, asserting 
multiple unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1), (3), 
and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), and (5).  
  In December, 2009, 
Grane officials conducted the initial hiring, and retained most, 
but not all, of the individuals who had been employed at 
Laurel Crest by Cambria County and who applied to be hired 
by Grane.  Among the former Laurel Crest employees not 
hired by Grane were several Local 1305 officers, including 
Sherry Hagerich, who was the Local 1305 president, and 
Mark Mulhearn, who was a business manager of Local 1305. 
 In December, 2009, in anticipation of the impending 
sale, Local 1305 requested by email that Grane recognize 
Local 1305 as the exclusive collective-bargaining 
representative of the nonprofessional employees at Laurel 
Crest.  By letter dated January 11, 2010, Grane refused the 
Local 1305 request.  Local 1305 then filed an unfair labor 
practice charge with the Board.  
                                                          
1 When Grane Healthcare Co. acquired Laurel Crest, it 
established a new entity, Ebensburg Care Center, LLC d/b/a 
Cambria Care Center, to manage it.  In the District Court, the 
parties disputed whether the two qualified as a “single 
employer” under the NLRA.  Since the single employer 
question is not at issue here, Appellants are referred to 
collectively as “Grane.” 
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The complaint contended, inter alia, that: (1) Grane’s refusal 
to recognize and bargain with Local 1305 as the collective-
bargaining representative of a bargaining unit of employees 
was a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act; and (2) 
Grane’s failure to hire certain applicants, including Mark 
Mulhearn and Sherry Hagerich, was a violation of § 8(a)(1) 
and (3) of the Act.2  Grane denied all of the alleged violations 
of the Act. 3
                                                          
2 The complaint also alleged that Grane and Cambria 
Care constituted a single employer under the Act, and listed 
three applicants in addition to Mulhearn and Hagerich whom 
Grane also allegedly refused to hire in violation of the Act.  
Since neither the single employer issue nor the instatement of 
the other three applicants is raised on appeal, we do not 
address those issues here. 
3 In January and April, 2010, SEIU Healthcare 
Pennsylvania, CTW, CLC (“SEIU”) also filed unfair labor 
practice charges against Grane.  In July, 2010, the Director 
filed a second complaint against Grane based on the SEIU 
charges.  The Director subsequently consolidated the two 
complaints. 
  In July and August of 2010, Administrative Law 
Judge David I. Goldman (“ALJ Goldman”) conducted 
hearings on the unfair labor practice charges. 
 On August 26, 2010, the Director petitioned the 
District Court for temporary injunctive relief pursuant to § 
10(j) of the Act.  The Director requested, in pertinent part, 
that the judge order Grane to: (1) recognize and bargain in 
good faith with Local 1305; and (2) reinstate Hagerich and 
Mulhearn. 
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 The District Court decided the petition on the basis of 
the record developed by ALJ Goldman in the administrative 
proceeding below—including the testimony and exhibits 
produced at the hearings as well as the parties’ factual 
stipulations—supplemented by testimony and arguments 
adduced at an evidentiary hearing the District Court 
conducted.  In December, 2010, well before the Court ruled 
on the § 10(j) petition, ALJ Goldman issued his decision in 
the administrative proceedings.4
                                                          
4ALJ Goldman held, inter alia, that Grane violated § 
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to recognize and 
bargain with Local 1305, and that it violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) 
by refusing to hire Mulhearn and Hagerich. 
  The District Court observed 
that it was “not bound to follow [ALJ] Goldman’s 
conclusions,” and explained that “[t]his administrative record 
and decision is, at best, characterized as persuasive.”  
Chester, 2011 WL 2517037 at *16.  Applying the four-factor 
test governing preliminary injunction motions, the District 
Court granted the interim bargaining order but denied the 
interim instatement of Hagerich and Mulhearn. 
 Both parties now appeal.  Grane appeals the temporary 
bargaining order, contending that the District Court 
committed error in concluding that the four-factor test was 
satisfied.  The Director cross-appeals on two grounds.  First, 
he contends that the District Court erred by rejecting our 
established two-part test and applying the four-part test 
instead.  Second, he argues that the § 10(j) petition qualified 
for injunctive relief under either the two-part or four-part test, 
and that the District Court therefore erred by declining to 
grant the interim instatement order. 
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II. Standard for §10 (j) Injunctive Relief 
 
A. 
 
 We begin our analysis by addressing the threshold 
issue of whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
Supreme Court precedent vitiates our established two-part test 
for § 10(j) relief.  “The issue of whether a district court 
applied the correct legal standard is a legal question, which 
this Court reviews de novo.”  Ahearn v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 
351 F.3d 226, 234 (6th Cir. 2003). 
B. 
 Congress vested primary jurisdiction over the 
elaboration of labor policy and the adjudication of labor 
disputes in the NLRB.  See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers 
Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (“The function 
of striking [the] balance [between conflicting legitimate 
interests] to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult 
and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed 
primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to 
limited judicial review.”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 
313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (“The exercise of the process [of 
administering the Act] was committed to the Board, subject to 
limited judicial review. Because the relation of remedy to 
policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, 
courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's 
discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding 
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more 
spacious domain of policy.”).  The NLRA provides for the 
adjudication of alleged unfair labor practices through an 
administrative process that involves initial fact-finding and 
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determination of the charges by an ALJ, whose decision is 
reviewable de novo by the Board.  The Act vests Courts of 
Appeals—and in certain circumstances the District Courts—
with judicial review of final Board decisions under a standard 
that requires considerable deference to various Board 
determinations.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f). 
 As originally enacted in 1935, the NLRA did not 
include any provision authorizing the Board to seek to enjoin 
alleged unfair labor practices pending adjudication of charges 
by the Board.5
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a 
complaint as provided in subsection (b) of this 
  Thus, unfair labor practices—by both unions 
and employers—could persist while administrative processes 
were pursued.  Congress sought to remedy this problem in the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 by mandating that the Board seek 
interim injunctive relief in an appropriate district court for 
certain enumerated unfair labor practices by unions, such as 
secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes and hot cargo 
contracts, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(l), and by authorizing, but not 
requiring, the Board to seek interim injunctive relief for other 
unfair labor practices.  See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).  Specifically § 
10(j), added in 1947, provides: 
                                                          
 5 The Board was only authorized to seek enforcement 
of its final orders by petitioning the appropriate federal court 
of appeals.  See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).  The Board could seek 
“appropriate temporary relief or restraining order,” and the 
court could award such relief “as it deems just and proper.”  
Id.  Similarly, when an aggrieved party sought review of a 
final Board order in an appropriate court of appeals, the court 
could “grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining 
order as it deems just and proper . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 160(f). 
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section charging that any person has engaged in 
or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to 
petition any United States district court, within 
any district wherein the unfair labor practice in 
question is alleged to have occurred or wherein 
such person resides or transacts business, for 
appropriate temporary relief or restraining 
order.  Upon the filing of any such petition the 
court shall cause notice thereof to be served 
upon such person, and thereupon shall have 
jurisdiction to grant to the Board such 
temporary relief or restraining order as it deems 
just and proper. 
29 U.S.C. § 160(j).  The Senate Report on the bill that 
became §10(j) explains the purposes of this section and the 
concerns that motivated it as follows: 
 [T]he committee is convinced that 
additional procedures must be made available 
under the National Labor Relations Act in order 
adequately to protect the public welfare . . . 
Time is usually of the essence in [§ 10(j) cases], 
and consequently the relatively slow procedure 
of the Board hearing and order, followed many 
months later by an enforcing decree of the 
circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving 
the desired objectives of the free flow of 
commerce and encouragement of the practice 
and procedure of free private collective 
bargaining.  Hence we have provided that the 
Board, acting in the public interest and not in 
vindication of purely private rights, may seek 
injunctive relief in the case of all types of unfair 
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labor practices . . . .  Experience under the 
National Labor Relations Act has demonstrated 
that by reason of lengthy hearing and litigation 
enforcing its order, the Board had not been able 
in some instances to correct unfair labor 
practices until after some substantial injury has 
been done . . . .  [I]t has sometimes been 
possible for persons violating the act to 
accomplish their unlawful objective before 
being placed under any legal restraint and 
thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to 
restore or preserve the status quo pending 
litigation. 
S. Rep. No. 105, at 8, 27 (1947). 
 In addressing “for the first time the proper application 
of Section 10(j)” in Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d at 140, 
we found guidance in Schauffler v. Highway Truck Drivers & 
Helpers, Local 107, 230 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1956).  In Schauffler, 
we held that to warrant § 10(l) relief, a district court must 
“find that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation 
of the [NLRA] as charged has been committed,” id. at 9, and 
that “a proper exercise of judicial discretion” warrants interim 
injunctive relief.  Id.  In Hartz Mountain, we adopted the 
same two part approach for § 10(j) petitions—“reasonable 
cause” to believe that the alleged unfair labor practice was 
committed and relief that is “just and proper,” stressing that 
deciding what relief, if any, was “just and proper” would be 
of “critical importance when relief is sought under Section 
10(j) . . . .”  Hartz Mountain, 519 F.2d at 141. 
 Since Hartz Mountain, we have consistently adhered 
to the two-prong standard, see, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. 
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N.L.R.B. v. Wellington Hall Nursing Home, Inc., 651 F.2d 
902, 905 (3d Cir. 1981); Hirsch v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 147 
F.3d 243, 247 (3d Cir. 1998), elaborating on the “reasonable 
cause” prong in Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1083-84, and the 
“just and proper” prong in Pascarell ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Vibra 
Screw Inc., 904 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1990).  We are 
joined by the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in 
applying this two-part test to § 10(j) petitions.  See Overstreet 
v. El Paso Disposal, L.P., 625 F.3d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding its “sequential, two-part[] inquiry” for § 10(j) 
injunctive relief); Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 237 (“The prevailing 
standard district courts in the Sixth Circuit employ when 
considering a § 10(j) petition is the ‘reasonable cause/just and 
proper’ standard.”); Sharp ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Webco 
Industries, Inc., 225 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing the two-part test as the standard for district 
courts in that circuit to apply to grant § 10(j) relief); Arlook ex 
rel. N.L.R.B. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 371 
(11th Cir. 1992) (same). 
 Other courts of appeals, including the Fourth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth, have rejected the two-part approach, and 
interpret § 10(j)’s just and proper clause as requiring the 
traditional four-factor equitable framework that courts apply 
to grant preliminary injunctions pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65(a).  See, e.g., Muffley ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. 
Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 542 (4th Cir. 2009); 
Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 490, n.3 (7th Cir. 
1989); Sharp v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., 172 F.3d 1034, 
1037 (8th Cir. 1999); Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 
F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).  The First and 
Second Circuits apply a hybrid standard: they apply the two-
prong, “reasonable cause/just and proper” test, but expressly 
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incorporate the four equitable criteria into the “just and 
proper” prong.  See, e.g., Pye ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Sullivan 
Bros. Printers, Inc., 38 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1994) (When 
deciding whether “injunctive relief is just and proper . . . the 
district court must apply the familiar, four-part test for 
granting preliminary relief.”)6
Under our Internal Operating Procedures, a panel of 
this Court cannot overrule an earlier binding panel decision; 
only the entire court sitting en banc can do so.  See Third 
Circuit I.O.P. 9.1.
; Hoffman v. Inn Credible 
Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d 360, 368 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In this 
Circuit, injunctive relief under § 10(j) is just and proper when 
it is necessary to prevent irreparable harm or to preserve the 
status quo.  While this standard preserves the traditional 
equitable principles governing injunctive relief, we are 
mindful to apply them in the context of federal labor laws.”) 
(citations omitted). 
C. 
7
                                                          
6 Contrary to the District Court’s suggestion, the First 
Circuit in Sullivan Bros. did not drop its “reasonable cause” 
prong.  Although noting that this inquiry is of “questionable 
utility,” the First Circuit declined to address its applicability 
because the parties did not challenge it.  Sullivan Bros., 38 
F.3d at 64 n.7. 
7 “It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels.  Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a 
precedential opinion of a previous panel.  Court en banc 
consideration is required to do so.”  Third Circuit I.O.P 9.1. 
  However, “a panel of our Court may 
decline to follow a prior decision of our Court without the 
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necessity of an en banc decision when the prior decision 
conflicts with a Supreme Court decision.”  United States v. 
Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009).  See also United 
States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[O]ur 
respect for the uniformity of decisions within this Court 
yields when a prior panel’s holding conflicts with a holding 
of the Supreme Court.”); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 698 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (“[A] change [by the Supreme 
Court] in the legal test or standard governing a particular area 
is a change binding on lower courts that makes results 
reached under a repudiated legal standard no longer 
binding.”); Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 627 (3d Cir. 
1975) (“We should not countenance the continued application 
in this circuit of a rule, even of our own devising, which is 
patently inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements.”). 
The District Court concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Romero-Barcelo and Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), require 
application of the traditional four-part equitable test.  In 
Romero-Barcelo, the Governor of Puerto Rico and residents 
of the island sought to enjoin the Navy’s use of an island off 
the Puerto Rican coast for weapons training exercises, 
claiming that the occasional discharge of weapons harmed the 
water quality, and that because the Navy had not obtained a 
permit, its conduct violated the permit requirements of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251, et seq.  See 456 U.S. at 307.  The First Circuit held 
that the FWPCA requires a district court to immediately 
enjoin conduct in violation of the permit requirements and 
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thereby preclude the exercise of traditional equitable 
discretion.  Id.  In reversing this decision, the Court 
emphasized that the judicial authority to grant injunctive 
relief is fundamentally rooted in principles of equity:  “The 
Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in 
the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the 
inadequacy of legal remedies.”  Id. at 312.  The Court 
confirmed the four-factor test, which incorporates these 
equitable considerations, as the applicable standard for 
injunctive relief.  Id. at 312-13.  In this regard, it described 
the high standard for overcoming the presumption that the 
four-factor test applies: “Unless a statute, in so many words, 
or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction 
is to be recognized and applied.”  Id. at 313 (quoting Porter v. 
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)). 
The Court reiterated this point in Winter.  In that case, 
environmental groups sought to enjoin the Navy from 
conducting sonar training exercises off the coast of southern 
California on the ground that the sonar devices harmed 
marine mammals.  555 U.S. at 12-14.  Despite the absence of 
any evidence that marine mammals had been harmed by the 
Navy’s training exercises, id. at 12, the district court granted 
the injunction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on a 
“possibility of irreparable injury.”  518 F.3d 658, 696 (9th 
Cir. 2008).  In overturning the injunction, the Court 
reaffirmed the four-factor equitable requirements, asserting 
that plaintiffs “must” satisfy them to qualify for injunctive 
relief.  555 U.S. at 20.  In this respect, the Court rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s standard as “too lenient,” holding that 
irreparable injury must be “likely in the absence of an 
injunction,” because a lower standard of a mere possibility “is 
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inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as 
an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”  Id. 
at 22. 
The District Court in the present matter opined that 
these two cases “suggest a clear and consistent message to the 
lower courts: courts are to apply the traditional four-factor 
test in the absence of a ‘necessary and inescapable’ 
congressional intent to depart from traditional equitable 
standards.  § 10(j) lacks such intent.”  Chester, 2011 WL 
2517037 at *4 (citing Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313).  In 
our view, neither Romero-Barcelo nor Winter present a 
conflict with our § 10(j) rulings sufficient to enable us to 
reverse nearly forty years of precedent. 
First, neither Romero-Barcelo nor Winter involved 
statutory schemes analogous to the NLRA.  Notwithstanding 
the broad language endorsing the primacy of the four-factor 
test, the Court rendered its decisions in those cases on facts 
that presented the standard scenario for courts granting 
injunctive relief.  In both cases, plaintiffs sought injunctions 
from district courts that also had full jurisdiction to decide the 
merits of the alleged statutory violations.  See Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 307-308; Winter, 555 U.S. at 16-17.  In 
the context of such generic circumstances, where the courts’ 
jurisdiction over the merits was not otherwise restricted, the 
Court had no occasion to qualify or condition its broad 
affirmation of the full scope of equity discretion. 
Nothing in these cases suggests that the Court 
contemplated the relatively unusual scenario of interim 
injunctive relief in the context of a pending unfair labor 
practice proceeding.  In light of the purposes behind this 
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provision and the Act, we believe that the holdings in 
Romero-Barcelo and Winter do not extend to the § 10(j) 
context.  Indeed, the NLRA erects a unique statutory scheme: 
it authorizes district courts to grant interim injunctive relief in 
labor dispute cases, an entire category over which they have 
no jurisdiction to decide the merits.  Instead, Congress 
designated the NLRB as the entity with the requisite expertise 
in unfair labor practices, and the merits of those claims are 
adjudicated through an administrative process that is largely 
independent of the courts. 
This specialized scheme distinguishes § 10(j) 
injunctive relief from the generic context, where district 
courts determine whether to grant relief in cases over which 
they possess both the jurisdiction and competence to decide 
the merits.  Congress’ clear purpose in creating § 10(j) was 
not to limit the scope of the Board’s authority to decide 
violations, but to preserve its powers to do so by giving the 
NLRB an opportunity to seek an injunction of alleged 
violations before an injury becomes permanent or the Board’s 
remedial purpose becomes meaningless. 
Moreover, the Board does not seek interim equitable 
relief to vindicate private rights, but acts instead in the public 
interest.8
                                                          
 8 The Board’s decision to initiate § 10(j) proceedings 
follows a multi-step investigation and evaluation process.  See 
Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 
Electronic Redacted Section 10(j) Manual Users Guide 11-14 
(2002).  The local region of the Board first conducts an 
investigation and evaluation of the unfair labor practice 
charge that mirror the two-part inquiry.  In its investigation, 
the Board determines “whether there is evidence establishing 
  See Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 876.  This factor also 
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distinguishes § 10(j) petitions from ordinary preliminary 
injunction motions.  Section 10(j) does not so expand the 
scope of the district court’s role in labor disputes as to permit 
it to intrude upon the Board’s exclusive authority to decide 
the merits of the cases.  The legislative scheme is therefore 
inconsistent with a full grant of equity jurisdiction to the 
district courts, which would permit them to exercise their own 
discretion in evaluating the likelihood of success on the 
merits, thereby infringing on the province of the Board.  We 
do not believe the Court intended its decisions in Romero-
Barcelo or Winter to extend to the context of such a distinct 
statutory scheme.  We therefore conclude that those cases are 
not conflicting authorities that require us to reverse our 
established precedent. 
Notably, three of our sister circuits have retained the 
two-part test in spite of Romero-Barcelo and Winter.  In 
Overstreet, the Fifth Circuit rejected arguments advanced in 
the respondent’s briefs that Romero-Barcelo required the 
four-part test.  625 F.3d at 851; Brief of Appellant at 36, 
Overstreet v. El Paso Disposal, L.P., 625 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 
2010) (No. 09-51006).  The Court distinguished § 10(j) from 
                                                                                                                                  
a violation of the Act” and also “whether a Board order in due 
course will be inadequate to protect statutory rights.”  Id. at 
10.  After its investigation, the Board decides “whether 10(j) 
proceedings are appropriate” by considering the evidence, 
threat of remedial failure, and “just and proper” theories and 
evidence.  Id. at 11.  The region may then submit a 
recommendation for § 10(j) proceedings to the Board’s 
General Counsel, who reviews the evidence and may submit a 
request for 10(j) injunctive relief to the Board, which makes 
the final decision authorizing or denying a § 10 (j) petition.  
Id. at 12-14. 
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other injunctive relief when it observed that the “‘traditional 
rules of equity may not control the proper scope of § 10 (j) 
relief,’” and explained: “A requirement…to make the NLRB 
show ‘irreparable harm’ and ‘likelihood of success’ for § 
10(j) relief would raise the factual threshold that the NLRB 
must reach.  Nothing in…our case law[] supports replacing 
the [two-part] test we currently use with” a test that 
incorporates the “traditional four-part test for equitable 
relief.”  625 F.3d at 851 (quoting Boire v. Pilot Freight 
Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1975).  See 
also Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 235 (“If the current 10(j) standard 
were in clear contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it 
seems unlikely that this or any other circuit would have 
continued to adhere to it for two decades without concern.”); 
Webco, 225 F.3d at 1137 (“[W]e will not reconsider this 
circuit’s longstanding Angle two-part test in favor of a 
traditional equitable analysis.”). 
Indeed, even those courts of appeals that have viewed 
Romero-Barcelo and Winter as requiring the four-part 
equitable test for § 10(j) relief have made modifications to the 
four-part test to accommodate the purposes and goals of the 
NLRA.  For example, the Ninth Circuit has explained that 
courts must consider the four equitable criteria “through the 
prism of the underlying purpose of § 10(j), which is to protect 
the integrity of the collective bargaining process and to 
preserve the Board’s remedial power while it processes the 
charge.”  Miller, 19 F.3d at 459-60.  The Miller Court also 
observed that it is “necessary to factor in the district court’s 
lack of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and the 
deference accorded to NLRB determinations by the courts of 
appeals.”  Id. at 460.  Accordingly, that Court holds that “the 
Board can make a threshold showing of likelihood of success 
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by producing some evidence to support the unfair labor 
practice charge, together with an arguable legal theory.”  Id. 
The Fourth Circuit, holding that Romero-Barcelo 
required it to apply the four-part test to § 10(j), was careful to 
note: “But, of course, district courts should apply this test in 
light of the underlying purpose of § 10(j):  preserving the 
Board’s remedial power pending the outcome of its 
administrative proceedings.”  Spartan Mining, 570 F.3d at 
543.  See also Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 
270, 287 (7th Cir. 2001) (“But, in evaluating the likelihood of 
success, it is not the district court's responsibility, nor is it 
ours, to rule on the merits of the Director's complaint; that is 
the Board's province. The court's inquiry is confined to the 
probability that the Director will prevail.”).  Similarly, the 
Second Circuit, which applies a hybrid test, follows the same 
considerations when applying the four-part test under its “just 
and proper” prong.  See, e.g., Hoffman, 247 F.3d at 368. 
Thus, even the courts that follow Romero-Barcelo 
account for the relatively unique context and purposes of § 
10(j), and none interprets the Court’s precedent as permitting 
the district courts to have full equity jurisdiction in this 
context.  If even the courts of appeals that apply the 
traditional four factors for preliminary injunctions to this 
context do not do so strictly, we comfortably conclude that 
the Supreme Court rulings do not so clearly conflict with our 
precedent as to mandate our abrogation of that precedent. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Court’s decisions 
apply to § 10(j) relief, we do not believe that our two-part 
standard is necessarily incompatible with the requirements of 
the traditional four-part test.  The District Court opined that 
our two-prong approach to § 10(j) petitions fails to 
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encompass the quartet of considerations ordinarily governing 
preliminary injunction motions.  The Court explicated: “The 
Third Circuit’s § 10(j) standard does not even require a 
showing of a ‘possibility’ of harm; only a showing of 
‘reasonable cause’ that a labor violation occurred.”  Chester, 
2011 WL 2517037 at *9.  It also asserted that the two-part 
test does not take into account the public interest or a 
balancing of harms: “The Third Circuit standard, other than 
references to ‘just and proper’ remedies, does not explicitly 
countenance these two crucial equitable factors.”  Id.  It 
further claimed, “[u]nder the Third Circuit’s precedents, no 
showing of harm is required,” id. at 12, and “merely a 
showing of ‘reasonable cause’ that a labor violation occurred 
is sufficient to issue an injunction, if said relief is ‘just and 
proper.’”  Id. 
The District Court’s conclusions about the test 
misapprehend our guidance with respect to district court 
consideration of § 10(j) petitions.  In this regard, it is simply 
not true that the two-part test only requires “reasonable 
cause” to believe the Director will prevail before the Board.  
Quite to the contrary, the test incorporates various 
considerations that correspond to each of the Winter factors. 
As an initial matter, it bears explaining that the 
“reasonable cause” analysis is not the deferential rubber 
stamp that the District Court and Grane characterize it to be. 
To establish reasonable cause in the Third Circuit, “there 
must be a substantial, non-frivolous, legal theory, implicit or 
explicit, in the Board’s argument, and second, taking the facts 
favorably to the Board, there must be sufficient evidence to 
support that theory.”  Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 882.  
Significantly, the circuits that apply the four-part test use a 
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substantially similar standard.  See, e.g., Miller, 19 F.3d at 
460. 
 Moreover, “[t]he Chancellor does not abdicate his 
powers merely upon a showing that the Regional Director's 
theories surpass frivolity.  He maintains some power to do 
equity and mold each decree to the necessities of the case.”  
Pilot Freight Carriers, 515 F.2d at 1192-93 (citation 
omitted).  In other words, the § 10(j) inquiry “necessarily 
subsumes equitable considerations.”  Webco, 225 F.3d at 
1137, n.3. 
 The standard we use to determine whether injunctive 
relief would be just and proper is “informed by the policies 
underlying § 10(j),” Dorsey Trailers, 147 F.3d at 247, looking 
in particular to “the general communication the law-making 
bodies were attempting to send to the courts and the public in 
passing the relevant act.”  Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1090.  
“In fashioning this provision, Congress sought to ensure that 
the Board would be able to exercise effectively its ultimate 
remedial power.”  Eisenberg ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Lenape 
Products, Inc., 781 F.2d 999, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986).  “[T]he 
focus in a § 10(j) determination is on the public interest, and 
‘the unusual likelihood . . . of ultimate remedial failure’ by 
the NLRB.”  Dorsey Trailers, 147 F.3d at 247 (citation 
omitted) (quoting Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1091 n.26).  
See also Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 879 (“[T]he critical 
determination is whether, absent an injunction, the Board’s 
ability to facilitate peaceful management-labor negotiation 
will be impaired.”); Lenape Products, 781 F.2d at 1003 
(“[T]he district court must find that the issuance of an 
injunction is ‘just and proper,’ i.e., that it is in the public 
interest to grant the injunction, so as to effectuate the policies 
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of the National Labor Relations Act or to fulfill the remedial 
function of the Board.”) (citing Wellington Hall, 651 F.2d at 
906-07). 
 Therefore, the goal of preserving the Board’s ultimate 
remedial power guides the courts to focus on whether the 
ongoing practices would create “irreparable” harms, i.e., 
injuries that could not be remedied by the Board’s final 
decision.  In conducting this inquiry, the courts weigh the 
same kinds of harms that factor into the traditional equitable 
test.  They consider the “likelihood of harm to the bargaining 
process,” Dorsey Trailers, 147 F.3d at 247 (citation omitted), 
and the overall public interest in “the promot[ion] of 
wholesome and mutually acceptable labor relations and the 
settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining 
between employees and their employer.”  Vibra Screw, 904 
F.2d at 876 (citation omitted).  In evaluating the net benefits 
of injunctive relief, the courts also weigh the relative harms it 
may prevent against the harms it may produce.  Id. at 878-79 
(evaluating how “the chilling effect of management 
retaliation may outlast the curative effects of any remedial 
action the Board might take . . . .”).  The Courts do not only 
weigh the harms to the Board, but also the harms injunctive 
relief poses to the employer.  See, e.g., Wellington Hall, 651 
F.2d at 907. 
 Indeed, we have denied injunctive relief where we 
found insufficient evidence of irreparable harm, making 
interim equitable relief not “just and proper.”  See, e.g., 
Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1095; Hartz Mountain, 519 F.2d 
at 143.  For instance, we affirmed the denial of § 10 (j) relief 
in Suburban Lines because “failure to grant interim 
reinstatement relief could not produce irreparable injury” and 
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“erroneously granted interim relief would irreparably injure” 
certain employees and the respondent in that case.  731 F.2d 
at 1092.  In Lenape Products, 781 F.2d at 1003-04, we held 
that § 10 (j) relief was not warranted because “there was no 
evidence that union activity would be ‘chilled’” and because 
“the size and intimacy of the group of the employees who 
walked out was such that if the Board ultimately orders 
reinstatement, its organizational efforts could be resumed.” 
 In summary, the two-part test does incorporate 
equitable factors into its analysis that other circuits consider 
when applying the four-part test to § 10(j) relief.  The 
reasonable cause prong has substantial overlap with the 
likelihood-of-success inquiry.  Likewise, the “just and 
proper” prong collapses the other three equitable factors into 
one comprehensive analysis.  Under this inquiry, the court 
determines whether an injunction is necessary to preserve the 
Board’s remedial powers, which incorporates a weighing of 
relative harms to the bargaining process, employees’ rights, 
and the likelihood of restoring the status quo absent injunctive 
relief, along with the public interests implicated by the labor 
disputes.  In light of these substantial similarities, we think 
that even if the Court’s decisions in Romero-Barcelo and 
Winter apply to the context of § 10(j) relief, our two-part test 
substantially complies with the requirements insofar as it does 
analyze each of the equitable factors. 
 The primary difference is that the two-part test 
accommodates the purposes of § 10(j) by granting a sufficient 
measure of deference to the Board to prevent the district court 
from overstepping its bounds and deciding the merits of 
alleged unfair labor practices.  As this Court has explained, 
the “just and proper” standard in § 10(j) is intended to limit 
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the district court’s role: “the phrase ‘just and proper’ [is] a 
method of cabining the otherwise unfettered discretion of the 
district court to fashion labor law under section 10(j) wholly 
according to its own notions of fairness and efficiency.”  
Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1089.  See also Ahearn, 351 F.3d 
at 237 (“A district court also must be mindful that 
‘[p]roceedings pursuant to § 10(j) are subordinate to the 
unfair labor practice proceedings to be heard before the 
Board.’. . .  Consequently, it is not the job of the district court, 
in considering a § 10(j) petition, ‘to adjudicate the merits of 
the unfair labor practice case.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel, Inc., 859 F.2d 26, 28 (6th 
Cir. 1988)).  Accordingly, the District Court erred in rejecting 
our two-prong test for § 10(j) petitions. 
III. Merits of § 10(j) Petition 
A. 
 Having concluded that the district court applied the 
incorrect legal standard to the Director’s § 10(j) petition, we 
turn now to consider whether the court erred in granting the 
interim bargaining order.  Although the district court applied 
the incorrect four-part standard in evaluating the Director’s § 
10(j) petition, we find it unnecessary to remand this issue for 
analysis under the two-part test, which involves analysis of 
similar factors under a less strict standard.
Interim Bargaining Order 
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9 See, e.g., Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 878, 879, 882 
(where the district court based its “just and proper” analysis 
on the wrong standard, and did not address the “reasonable 
cause” prong, the Third Circuit declined to remand, and 
instead made the “exceedingly simple” reasonable cause 
determination itself, found that the injunction was “just and 
  We think the 
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undisputed facts on the record show that the interim 
bargaining order is plainly warranted under the two-part test. 
1. Reasonable Cause 
 To establish reasonable cause to believe that the 
Director is likely to prevail on his claim, we must find that 
this claim is based on a legal theory that is “substantial and 
not frivolous” and that the facts, when taken in a favorable 
light to the Board, are sufficient to support that theory.  Vibra 
Screw, 904 F.2d at 882.  In evaluating reasonable cause, we 
are mindful that it is not our role to adjudicate the merits of 
the underlying claim. 
 Under § 8(a)(5) of the Act, an employer has a duty to 
“bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees, subject to the provisions of [section 9(a)] of this 
title.”  29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5).  A new employer has a duty 
under § 8(a)(5) to bargain with the incumbent union that 
represented the predecessor’s employees when there is a 
“substantial continuity” between the predecessor and 
successor enterprises.  Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. 
v. N.L.R.B., 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987).10
                                                                                                                                  
proper,” and remanded the case with directions to grant 
injunction); Frye ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Specialty Envelope, Inc., 
10 F.3d 1221, 1225 (6th Cir. 1993) (where the district court 
did not apply the correct standard for § 10(j) relief, the Sixth 
Circuit declined to remand and decided the question itself). 
10 Other factors reflective of continuity include 
similarity between, inter alia, the business operations, 
services provided, customers, jobs performed by employees, 
and working conditions.  Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43. 
  This includes such 
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continuity of the workforce that the new employer “would 
confront the same union representing most of the same 
employees in the same unit.”  N.L.R.B. v. Burns Int’l Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280 n.4 (1972).  The question of 
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that Grane’s 
conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice depends on 
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the Director 
will prevail on his claim that Grane is a legal successor to 
Cambria County, and therefore had a duty to recognize and 
bargain with Local 1305. 
 Grane does not dispute that the facts on the record 
satisfy the standard for substantial continuity:  it did hire a 
majority of the Laurel Crest employees and continues the 
operations of Laurel Crest as a nursing home.  However, 
notwithstanding that it qualifies as a successor employer 
under the substantial continuity test, Grane contends that 
successorship principles do not apply in the context of a 
transition from a public to private employer.  In this respect, 
Grane observes that because Cambria County was a “public 
employer” under the terms of state labor law, PERA, 43 P.S. 
§ 1101.301(1), and was expressly excluded from coverage 
under the NLRA, Grane therefore cannot be a “predecessor 
employer” under the Act.  Likewise, it argues that because 
Local 1305 was certified under state labor laws rather than 
the Act, it too cannot qualify as an “incumbent Union” within 
the terms of the Act. 
 The gravamen of Grane’s arguments is that the 
successorship principle has no application in the context of a 
transition from public to private employers.  In this regard, it 
explains that Local 1305 is not a “labor organization” within 
the terms of section 9(a) of the Act because it “has never been 
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‘selected’ by ‘employees’ of an ‘employer’ under Section 
9(a).”  (Grane’s Br. at 25.)11
 The Director’s successorship theory is hardly a novel 
legal position.  In several cases, the courts and the Board have 
applied successorship principles in the context of the public to 
private transition.  In Dean Transp., Inc., 350 NLRB 48 
(2007), enf’d, 551 F.3d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the Board held 
that a union certified by a state agency was a labor 
organization under the Act, and the fact that the predecessor 
was a public employer did not prevent the court from 
imposing a successorship obligation on the private employer.  
  As a result, Grane observes that 
neither Local 1305 nor Cambria County “had any status under 
the Act before January 1, 2010,” and that Grane therefore 
“has been placed into the metaphysical quandary of being the 
successor employer to a non-existent predecessor.”  (Id. at 
26). 
 It is not our task to decide the merits of Grane’s 
arguments that successorship principles should be applied in 
the context of public to private transitions.  Rather, our 
“reasonable cause” inquiry directs us to examine whether the 
Director’s legal theory is “substantial and non-frivolous.”  We 
have little difficulty concluding that standard is met, and there 
is reasonable cause to believe that the Director will prevail in 
establishing that Grane is a successor employer. 
                                                          
11 Section 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or 
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such 
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.”  29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
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Id. at 50-51.  In applying the Fall River “substantial 
continuity” test, the Board noted that it “has applied this test 
even where, as here, the predecessor is a public entity.”  350 
NLRB at 58.  See also Cmty Hospitals of Cent. Cal. v. 
N.L.R.B., 335 F.3d 1079, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The change 
from public to private ownership of the hospital does not 
undermine the Board’s finding that Community was a 
successor.”); Lineback v. Irving Ready-Mix, Inc., 653 F.3d 
566, 573 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting “[t]he solid line of cases . . . 
support[ing] the district court’s conclusion that the Director is 
likely to succeed on the merits” of his successorship claim in 
the context of a public to private transition); Van Lear Equip., 
Inc., 336 NLRB 1059, 1064 (2001) (“[T]he successorship 
doctrine continues to apply even though the predecessor . . . is 
a public employer.”); Lincoln Park Zoological Soc., 322 
NLRB 263, 364-65 (1996), enf’d 116 F.3d 216, 220 (7th Cir. 
1997) (applying the successorship principle in the context of a 
public to private transition).  
In light of this case law it is evident that there is 
reasonable cause for the charge that Grane’s refusal to 
recognize and bargain with the incumbent union, Local 1305, 
is a violation of the Act. 
2. Just and Proper 
 To determine whether injunctive relief is “just and 
proper,” we consider the “policies underlying § 10(j),” 
Dorsey Trailers, 147 F.3d at 247, including the public interest 
in “the settlement of labor disputes through collective 
bargaining,” Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 876 (quoting Hartz 
Mountain, 519 F.2d at 142), and “whether the failure to grant 
interim injunctive relief would be likely to prevent the Board, 
acting with reasonable expedition, from effectively exercising 
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its ultimate remedial powers.”  Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 
1091-92.  The Director argues that the interim bargaining 
order is just and proper because Grane’s current refusal to 
recognize or bargain with Local 1305 is depriving employees 
of the benefits of collective bargaining and causing 
irreparable erosion of Union support.  The Director argues 
that this damage will render the Board’s ultimate remedial 
order ineffective.  Grane contends that the Director’s 
evidence is inadequate to substantiate these claims, disputing 
several factual claims made by the Director and arguing that 
the lack of adequate evidence to establish a threat to the 
Board’s remedial authority forecloses a finding that the 
bargaining order is just and proper. 
 To establish the chilling effect that Grane’s conduct 
has had on the employees, the Director cites testimony 
adduced at the ALJ hearings from current and former Laurel 
Crest employees and Local 1305 officers.  Their testimony 
cited conversations with five identified employees, who had 
reportedly said that they felt that they were being watched by 
Grane officials; were scared to support the Union; were 
constantly reminded that there was no union; and expressed 
concerns about the Union’s status and future.  The testimony 
also establishes that other public Union activities, including 
regular meetings and pre-takeover picketing, have ceased 
since Grane’s refusal to recognize Local 1305.  Grane 
contends that this evidence is insufficient to prove that the 
Union’s loss of support will cause irreparable harm, and 
argues that Union support was tepid to begin with.  In this 
respect, Grane cites the attendance records of the Union 
meetings.  Because the parties dispute the total number of 
Local 1305 members, the parties also dispute the relevance of 
these records as a measure of Union support. 
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 It is well-recognized that when a successor employer 
refuses to recognize an incumbent union, it “inflicts a 
particularly potent wound on the union and its members.”  
Bloedorn, 276 F.3d at 298.  Indeed, “[g]iven the uncertainties 
that both the union and its members face during the 
transition,” a successor’s denial of recognition “disrupts the 
employees' morale, deters their organizational activities, and 
discourages their membership in unions.”  Id. (quoting Fall 
River, 482 U.S. at 49-50).  An ultimate Board order that 
Grane recognize the Union may be ineffective if the Union 
has lost significant support. 
 Moreover, a bargaining order is also necessary to 
preserve the “fruits of the collective bargaining process that 
otherwise would have been available” to the employees prior 
to such an order.  Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1093.  The 
courts have recognized this harm as a basis for injunctive 
relief even under the stringent four-factor test.  See, e.g., 
Bloedorn, 276 F.3d at 299 (“Meanwhile, the RSI employees 
whom FFI did hire are working without the advocacy of their 
chosen representative. Assuming that the Board ultimately 
orders FFI to bargain with the Union, such a forward-looking 
order cannot fully compensate the employees of FFI for the 
variety of benefits that good-faith collective bargaining with 
the Union might otherwise have secured for them in the 
present.”).  For these reasons, we find that the interim 
bargaining order is necessary to preserve the Board’s 
remedial powers, and therefore is “just and proper.” 
B. 
 Finally, we turn to the district court’s denial of the 
interim instatement order for Hagerich and Mulhearn.  The 
District Court denied this order under the more demanding 
Interim Instatement Order 
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standard of the four-part test.  Unlike the interim bargaining 
order, however, we do not think there are sufficient 
undisputed facts on the record for this Court to evaluate 
whether the order should be granted under the two-part test.  
We therefore remand this aspect of the Director’s petition to 
the District Court to conduct an analysis of the facts under the 
two-part test. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District 
Court’s grant of the interim bargaining order, but remand the 
Director’s request for an interim instatement order to the 
District Court to determine whether relief is appropriate under 
the two-part test. 
